The New Deal: IX
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Politics of the New Deal: Overview
The "Art" of the New Deal
The art of the New Deal lay in its politics. It demanded political artistry from President Roosevelt and congressional leaders, Brain Trusters, judges, and even ordinary Americans who now had the opportunity to choose the future direction of the nation’s political life. What events shaped their choices, and what did the nation’s political life look like at the end of the New Deal?
Roosevelt's First Term
During his first term in office, FDR could count on broad support from the Democratic Congress. Fed up with Hoover and the Republicans, and desperate to enact programs to turn the tide of Depression, Congress whipped New Deal bills through committee and on to a vote--often within the space of hours. Thus, Roosevelt did not encounter a great deal of resistance from Congress during his first term. As mentioned earlier, his greatest political challenge early in the first term came from the Left--from men like Father Charles Coughlin and Senator Huey Long--as well as from some conservative Republican groups such as the American Liberty League, though the latter was so narrowly based it failed to pose a significant challenge.
"Yellow Dog Democrats"
At the start of the New Deal, Southerners held positions of great power within the Democratic Party, because the Democratic Party was the “only” party in the white South. No candidate could win the Democratic nomination without their support. Thus, FDR needed to have Southern Democrats (often called "yellow dogs" because Southerners would vote for even a yellow dog on the Democratic ticket rather than a Republican) on his side for his New Deal to become reality. Thus, the character of the First New Deal reflected the conservative nature of Roosevelt's support base within Congress. Programs were federal in nature--that is, funds came from Washington, but the administration of those funds fell to state and local politicians and organizations. This insured the support of these politicians for the New Deal--after all, they could hardly condemn programs they administered themselves!--but it also invited political abuse of those programs by the politicians who ran them. For example, within a state and even within a single party, different factions vied for power and control. Those in charge at the time of the First New Deal could--and often did--spread funds around to their political friends and denied them to their political enemies. Those on the "outs" within that state thus complained to Washington that the New Deal unfairly helped their political rivals. So long as the individual states remained in charge of the administration of New Deal programs, this would remain a problem.
Challenge from the Left: Senator Huey P. Long
As noted earlier, FDR faced serious challenges from those to the left of the political spectrum. Of these, he was most afraid of Senator Huey P. Long, whose rising popularity showed that Long might challenge FDR for the Democratic nomination in 1936.
Long's home state of Louisiana was a classic example of how New Deal patronage exacerbated political conflict and invited corruption. At the start of Roosevelt's first term, Long, as a United States Senator, expected to have the last word when it came to distribution of New Deal funds within his state. This was simply a courtesy extended to all senators. Long had even more reason to expect favor from FDR because Long had helped swing the Louisiana delegation towards FDR at the 1932 Democratic National Convention. Not long after Roosevelt's election, though, Long's political enemies came to FDR and informed him of the political dangers posed by Senator Long. Long, who had served as Louisiana's governor from 1929 to 1933 (although elected to the Senate in 1932, he did not take up his Senate seat officially until his term as governor expired), had established a political dictatorship within the Pelican State. Those who did not pay tribute to the Long "machine" found themselves excluded from state contracts and favor. For example, their areas of the state did not get tax funds for roads and schools. Meanwhile, Long's friends grew rich on kickbacks and other favors. Long's political enemies feared that if Long were given control of the massive funds coming out of Washington, the Senator's stranglehold over state government would grow even tighter. So Roosevelt failed to follow protocol by consulting with Long on distribution of New Deal funds within Louisiana. Moreover, New Deal administrators went so far as to appoint "anti-Longs" to prominent positions within Louisiana's New Deal administration. In doing so, FDR insured that Long would turn his wrath against the administration and against Roosevelt in particular.
Roosevelt and the Second New Deal
"Share Our Wealth"
By 1934, Long began a full-frontal assault on Roosevelt and the New Deal. He used his power within the state to pass laws blocking distribution of New Deal funds without his personal approval. More importantly, he constructed a rival organization to challenge the New Deal throughout the nation. He called his group "Share Our Wealth." His program was vague on specifics, but included a proposal for a cap on incomes, limiting annual income to $100,000, and a pension for older Americans.
Like Roosevelt, Long was a very charismatic figure. Like Roosevelt, he knew how to use the media to promote himself and his cause. He used the radio to promote "Share Our Wealth," and SOW clubs sprang up all over the country with an estimated million members.
Thus, by the spring of 1935, Roosevelt had much to fear from Long's radical challenge. Not surprisingly, then, when, FDR called Congress into special session that March, the programs of the Second New Deal appeared surpisingly similar to some of Long's proposals. This was particularly true of Social Security. The Act established pensions for certain categories of American workers over the age of 65, established unemployment benefits and workmen's compensation--all designed (at least in part) to steal Long's thunder on the Left. Another program, the WPA, which supplanted both FERA and PWA, was also influenced by Long. The WPA, unlike FERA and PWA, was administered directly by the federal government. This left no room for state and local politicians like Long to use federal funds to promote their personal political factions, or to take federal money as "kickbacks."
With the Second New Deal, then, FDR had positioned himself politically more to the Left in hopes of coopting some of Long's support. As it happened, Long did not challenge FDR for the presidential nomination in 1936 after all. He was killed by an assasin in his home state of Louisiana in September of 1935. By that time, new challenges forced FDR to turn his attentions to a challenge from an unexpected--and even more dangerous--corner: the Supreme Court.
AAA
In January of 1936, the New Deal received another, serious blow when the Supreme Court declared the AAA unconstitutional. In 1934, Congress had refined the New Deal as passed the previous year by passing the Bankhead Act. The original AAA contained no penalties for farmers who promised to retire land from production then reniged. After prices rose slightly after the 1933 harvest, many farmers were also determined to go back to their old ways and plant more crops rather than participate in AAA. So the Bankhead Act amended the AAA by instituting a processing tax. This tax was assessed at the point where crops were "processed"--the cotton gin or the grist mill. That way, if a farmer pledged to grow only so many acres of crops, with a fixed estaimate yield, and produced in excess of that amount--in other words, cheated--the processor would add a tax to the cost of those excess crops. Thus, the farmer would not gain anything from growing more than he promised. However, the Supreme Court said this tax was unconstitutional because it unfairly restrained trade, and thus violated anti-trust laws.
Domestic Soil Conservation and Allotment Act
Panicked at the prospect of falling prices, farmers urged Congress to pass new legislation. In the short term, Congress passed the Domestic Soil Conservation and Allotment Act. It essentially continued the same policies of the AAA, but changed the justification. Whereas the AAA based its policy on the goal of raiding prices, the new Act simply changed the wording to say that rented land would be removed from production to conserve the soil. It also placed the authority of running the program in the hands of the states. These two changes effectively addressed the legal objections to AAA while continuing the program basically intact. (Because the Act wasn't based on price, it avoided falling under the commerce clause of the constitution. This would safeguard it from future charges of violating federal anti-trust statutes. Placing administrative authority in the hands of the states further insured that the Act would not violate interstate commerce laws.)
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