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Expansion
of the railroad system in the United States proceeded swiftly
after 1840—most of it in the Northeastern states. By 1850,
private railroad companies had laid 9,000 miles of track east of the
Mississippi River. The conclusion of the U. S.-Mexican War in
1848
opened the prospect of more track west of the Mississippi; however, the
distances and financial demands made any hope of a transcontinental
railroad
an impossible dream. |
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| Gold in
California |
The discovery of gold in California in 1849 changed all that. The
expense of shipping goods from eastern ports around the tip of South
America and thence to California—a long and expensive trip—suddenly
made the construction of a transcontinental railroad very
desirable. (For example, it was more expensive to ship goods from
China to San Francisco than from Missouri!) Yet many problems
prevented the realization of this venture for over a decade. One
of these remained the cost of construction. No single company
could muster the capital to begin and sustain such a huge
undertaking. Another problem lay in ownership of the land.
The federal government controlled most of the new western territory
over which any railroad would be laid, and therefore any question
concerning the project necessarily involved the federal government
problems. At the time, the growing crisis between North and South
over the issue of slavery divided the federal government, hampering
efforts to mobilize support for a transcontinental railroad.
Northern business interests argued that they should get the
railroad. A transcontinental railroad would provide a necessary
link between producers of raw materials in the West—miners and
farmers—and manufacturers. Moreover, the North already possessed
a highly developed internal network of rail lines that could
be tied into and support the larger road. The South, by contrast,
had few railroads and almost no manufacturing. True, Southern
interests agreed, but that would change if the transcontinental line
would pass through their section. The government had long favored
Northern manufacturers at the expense of Southern producers—the hated
protective tariff representing only the worst example—so it was only
fair that the federal government
balance the scales by awarding the road to the South. Southern
hopes
received a boost in 1853 when the United States obtained a section of
land
south of the New Mexico territory (the Gadsden Purchase) that would
enable
construction of a direct route between the South’s major port, New
Orleans,
and San Diego, California, without the difficulty of passing through
Mexican
territory. This spurred Northern interests to redouble their
efforts
to organize the remaining territory of the Louisiana Purchase to
further
their drive to lay a railroad between Chicago and California.
Consequently,
Illinois Senator Stephen A.
Douglas engineered the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which provided territorial governments
for the critical portion of land between East and West. In order
to purchase Southern support for his gambit, Douglas introduced the
idea of popular sovereignty into the proposal for territorial
governments, in violation of the Missouri Compromise. The
proposal passed Congress by a narrow margin, but fatally split the
government and killed the Second
Party System . The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 broke the sectional impasse. The departure of Southern congressmen and senators opened the way for Northern representative to pass the necessary legislation to establish a transcontinental railroad in their section. |
| The Iron Road |
As described above, the federal government, as
the largest landowner in the West, would necessarily figure into any
plans to build the West. Yet the scale of the project
demanded an even greater commitment than ever before by the federal
government—and thus the American taxpayer—to financing (capitalizing)
and sustaining a private venture (the railroad) both through the
construction phase as well as the early years of operation.
Congress therefore passed a series of acts that would facilitate
construction of the transcontinental railroad. First, Congress
passed the Pacific Railroad
Act of 1862. The Act provided land grants, mortgages,
loans, and other assistance to two corporations chartered to build the
railroad, which experts figured would cost $100 million—double the
federal budget of 1861—and an estimated 14 years to complete. The
government then awarded contracts to two corporations—the Union
Pacific Railroad and the Central Pacific
Railroad —to build the line. The Union Pacific would start
from Omaha, Nebraska, and build west while the Central Pacific would
start in Sacramento, California, and build east. As an incentive
for speed—and to help provide long-term capital to the
builders—Congress also passed the Land Grant Act of 1862. The Act
provided that the government would
grant to each corporation ten miles of land along either side of the
road. The corporations could then sell this land to future
settlers
and use the profit to help recoup the cost of construction.
Second, Congress passed the Homestead
Act of 1862. The Act gave away 180 acres of land to anyone
who would file a claim on that land and live on it for five
years. The Act was a boon for farmers back east, where land was
scarce, but it was an even bigger boon for the railroads. The
farmers would provide a ready-made source of produce for the railroads
to sell, as well as a ready-made market for goods sold by the
railroad. In any event, the Homestead Act greatly speeded up the
settlement of the West by whites. |
| The Central
Pacific |
The Central Pacific
broke ground on January 8,1863, and began
its race to the east. Immediately, the Central Pacific ran into
trouble with its labor supply. Those men that weren’t involved
in the Civil War were more interested in mining for gold than in hard
labor on the railroad. Three out of five men quit to go look for
gold or to work in the new silver mines in Nevada. When it
advertised
for 5,000 men, only 600 applied. Consequently, the Central
Pacific
managed to build only 31 miles of track by 1864. Thus far the railroad had advertised for white labor only, but white laborers had proven more interested in quick wealth than in railway work, so the Central Pacific turned to another source of labor: Chinese immigrants. Other California railroads had employed Chinese laborers since 1858. In February 1865, the C.P.’s head of construction, Mark
Crocker, hired 50 Chinese laborers for a trial on the
railway.
They proved so successful that soon over 15,000 Chinese labored on the
Central Pacific’s payrolls. Four-fifths of all grading work
between Sacramento to the eventual terminus at Ogden was performed by
Chinese labor,
and by 1869 nine-tenths of the entire Central Pacific labor for was
Chinese.
Chinese workers were frugal, clean, sober—a rare quality in that day
and
age—and hard-working. They were also cheap and expendable.
The
Chinese worked more cheaply than white labor. Starting wages for
a Chinese laborer was $28 per month. Unlike white workers, he was
required to provide all his own food, utensils, and living quarters
(i.e.,
tent), and since it cost $0.75-1.00 per day to feed a white worker,
Chinese
laborers saved the Central Pacific a minimum of $5 million.
Chinese
lives were also cheaper than white when it came to performing dangerous
work on the line. The danger of blasting passes through granite,
snow-covered mountains—which could rain down death and destruction in
the form of
rock slides of avalanches at any time—resulted in the death of
thousands
of Chinese workers. Yet in spite of the invaluable contribution
of the Chinese workers to the construction of the Transcontinental
Railroad, the commemorative photograph taken at the official ceremony
did not include a single Chinese worker. |
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That ceremony occurred on May 10, 1869,
when the Central Pacific and Union Pacific officially joined at
Promontory Summit near Ogden, Utah. Construction had taken only
eight years out of the originally projected fourteen years. The
Central Pacific had “won” the race, building 1,800 miles of road over
two mountain ranges—the Sierra Nevada and Rocky Mountains—climbing
7,000 feet in just over 100 miles, and 2,000 feet over 20 miles.
By contrast, the Union Pacific built only 689 miles of track the
prairies of the Midwest. The Central Pacific and its
Chinese workers achieved this magnificent feat without
mechanization—all work was done by hand, with pickaxes, shovels,
baskets, and 1-horse carts. The tycoons of the two railroads profited handsomely from their endeavors. A later congressional investigation revealed that of the $73 million paid to the Union Pacific, no more than $50 could be justified as true cost. The rest disappeared into the pockets of corporate directors . The corporate board of the Central Pacific—the so-called "Big Four" comprising Leland Stanford, Colis P. Huntington, Mark Hopkins, and Charles Crocker—did even better: they made at least $63 million and owned Central Pacific stock worth $100 million, as well as 9 million acres of land. Ironically, the great railway had disastrous results for the Chinese. With the opening of the railway, new immigrants could cross the continent for only $40, and soon the West was flooded with immigrants. This surplus of labor resulted in lower wages for all. After the Crash of 1873, unemployment rose dramatically, and the Chinese provided a convenient scapegoat. In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act barring further immigration of Chinese to the United States. Based solely on unfounded prejudice, the Act represented the first restriction ever placed on immigration in this country. |
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| Railroads: Model for Big Business |
The expansion of railroads created the potential for a nationwide
market, stimulated the economic development of the West, and created a
demand for iron, steel, locamotives, and similar products.
Railroad companies also provided a model for newly emerging industrial
enterprises. Because they spanned such great distances and managed so many employees and so much equipment, railroads often encountered problems of scale that few companies had faced before but that other industrial entrepreneurs soon had to address. Not surprisingly, businesses that came along later adopted solutions that railroads first developed. Railroad companies required a much higher degree of coordination and long-range planning than most businesses up to that time. Earlier companies typically operated at a single location, but railroads functioned over long distances and in multiple sites of operation. They had to keep up numerous maintenance and repair facilities and maintain many stations to receive and discharge both freight and passengers. Financial transactions carried on over hundreds of miles by scores of employees required a centralized accounting office. One result was development of a company bureaucracy of clerks, accountants, managers, and agents. Railroads became training grounds for administrators, some of whom later entered other industries. Indeed, the experience of railroads was central in defining the subject of business administration when it began to be taught at the turn of the century. Railroads required far more capital than most manufacturing concerns. In 1875 the largest steel furnaces in the world cost $741,000; at the same time, the Pennsylvania Railroad was capitalized at more $400 million. (One dollar in 1875 had the purchasing power of more than $14 today.) Even railroads that received large government subsidies required large amounts of private capital--and Congress gave out the last federal land grant in 1871. Private capital and support came from state and local governments underwrote the enormous railroad expansion of the 1880s. The railroads' huge appetite for capital made them the first American businesses to seek investors on a nationwide and international scale. Those who invested their money could choose either stocks or bonds. Sales of railroad stocks provided the major activity for the New York Stock Exchange through the second half of the nineteenth century. Railroads faced higher fixed costs than most previous companies. These costs included commitments to bondholders and the expense of maintaining and protecting far-flung equipment and property. To pay their fixed costs and keep profits high, railroads tried to operate at full capacity whenever possible. Doing so, however, sometimes proved difficult. Where two or more lines competed for the same traffic, one might choose to cut rates in an effort to lure business from the other. But if the other company responded with cuts in its rates, neither stood to gain significantly more business, and both took in less income. Competition between railroad companies sometimes became so intense that no line could show a profit. Some railroad operators chose to defuse such intense competition by forming a pool. In a pool, railroads agreed to divide existing business among themselves and not to compete on rates. The most famous was the Iowa Pool, made up of railroads running between Chicago and Omaha, across Iowa. Formed in 1870, the Iowa Pool operated until 1874, and some pooling continued until the mid-1880s. Few pools lasted long. Often one or more pool members tired of a restricted market share and broke the pool arrangement in an effort to expand, thereby setting off a new price war. When a pooling arrangement became known, it brought loud complaints from customers, who concluded they paid higher rates because of the pool. To compete more effectively, railroads adjusted their rates to attract companies that did a great deal of shipping. Favored customers sometimes received a rebate. Large shipments sent over long distances cost the railroad company less per mile than small shipments over short distances, so companies developed rate structures for long hauls and short hauls. Thus the largest shippers, with the power to secure rebates and low rates, could ship more cheaply than small businesses or individual farmers. Railroad companies defended the differences on the basis of differences in costs, but small shippers who paid high prices saw themselves victims of discrimination. Railroads viewed state and local governments as sources of valuable subsidies. At the same time, they constantly guarded against efforts by their customers to use government to restrict or regulate their enterprises--by outlawing rate discrimination, for example. Companies sometimes campaigned openly to secure the election of freindly representatives and senators and to defeat unfriendly candidates. They maintained well-organized operations to lobby public officials in Washington, D. C., and in state capitals. Most railroad companies issued free passes to public officials--a practice that reformers attacked as bribery. (Stories of railroad officials bribing politicians became commonplace after the Civil War. The Crédit Mobilier scandal touched some of the most influential members of Congress in the 1870s. We will discuss this at greater length in the lecture on politics in the Gilden Age.) |
| Visit Hart's Illustrated Traveler's Map of the Central Pacific Railroad (Note: this is a media-rich site and task a while to download) |
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